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The Legal History of Safekeeping and Safe
Deposit Activities in the United States
Richard A. Lord*
I. INTRODUCTION
Today in the United States, bankers take for granted that
the functions of banking include the safekeeping of customer
valuables and the offering of safe deposit services. Virtually
every commercial bank makes safekeeping and safe deposit
services available, either through a department of the bank or
through a subsidiary or affiliated safe deposit company. In
some parts of the country, the demand for safe deposit facili-
ties has led banks to increase the fees for safe deposit services
and has revitalized an old industry: safe deposit companies
whose sole function is the storage of documents, jewelry, coin
and stamp collections, and other assorted valuables.
This article explores the legal history of safekeeping and
safe deposit activities so that future problems that arise in con-
nection with safe deposit services may be dealt with in a ra-
tional manner, consistent with historical developments.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Historically, the safekeeping function is perhaps the old-
est function in banking,' having been performed by bankers
and others in the community who were deemed worthy of the
public's trust. Although there is little documented evidence, it
appears that the first commercial banks in the American colo-
nies engaged in safekeeping activities of some type and did so
without explicit authority in their charters or by-laws.2 Even
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Campbell University. B.A., Alfred
University, 1971; J.D., Memphis State University, 1975; LL.M., Yale University, 1976.
1. G. MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 811 (7th ed. 1973);
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF BANKING, PRINCIPLES OF BANK OPERATIONS 272 (1966);
N. HOGGSON, BANKING THROUGH THE AGES 33-43 (1926).
2. See 1825 N.Y. Laws 204-210; 1825 N.Y. Laws 198-201; 1838 N.Y. Laws 245-
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the National Currency Act of 1864' did not provide for the
conduct of safekeeping or safe deposit activities by national
banks, although banks apparently engaged in such activities
and were implicitly authorized to do so by the National Cur-
rency Act's proscription of any activity not incidental to
banking.4
By the mid-1800's, safe deposit corporations began to be
formed, partly because of scientific advances, partly to com-
pete with banks, and partly because the safekeeping function
of banks had never been particularly profitable.' Often a bank
would agree to safekeep a customer's personalty at little or no
cost. Moreover, even the rental of safe deposit boxes was for a
modest fee, which did not reflect the true cost of the depart-
ment. Safekeeping and safe deposit functions were performed
almost purely as a service to the customer, occasionally gratu-
itously, but more often for a nominal fee, and, in either event,
were truly incidental to .the business of banking.6
The fact that safe deposit and safekeeping services were
incidental to the business of banking, although earlier recog-
nized by the states, 7 was not explicitly recognized by Congress
until 1927 when it enacted the proviso to section 24 of the
National Bank Act.' Even that legislation did not explicitly
confer upon national banks the right to engage in the safe de-
posit business. Rather, it permitted national banks to invest in
safe deposit companies.
The dual nature of our banking system has always cre-
3. First codified in 18 Stat. Title LXII §§ 5133-5234 (1878); codified today as The
National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 38 (1982). That banks did engage in safekeeping activi-
ties is clear from the early cases, see, e.g., Roberts v. Stuyvesant Safe Deposit Co., 123
N.Y. 57, 25 N.E. 294, reh'g denied, - N.Y. -, 25 N.E. 955 (1890); Safe Deposit Co. v.
Pollock, 85 Pa. 391, (1878).
4. 18 Stat. Title LXII § 5136 (1878). To the extent that banks were engaged in
safekeeping activities at the time of the National Bank Act's passage, which is clear
from the case law, Congress must have considered this function incidental to the busi-
ness of banking or the activity would have been proscribed.
5. McBain, Safe Deposit Department, 72 BANKING L.J. 533 (1955).
6. Id. at 534.
7. See 2 PATON'S DIGEsT 2246-48 (1926). See also Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Bed-
ford, 340 U.S. 41, 49-50 (1940).
8. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982).
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ated competitive tension between state and national banks.9
Thus, to the extent that state banks were permitted to and in
fact did engage in safe deposit and safekeeping activities, na-
tional banks were sure to follow. Beginning around the
1900's, some state banks were granted explicit authority to en-
gage in safe-deposit activities. 10 Moreover, a number of banks,
both state and national, took for granted that they were enti-
tled to engage in safe deposit activities. Thus, there are indi-
cations that safe deposit activities in the 1920's were regularly
being performed by national banks.11 However, it was not un-
til the late 1930's that the courts decided the issue of whether
a national bank could engage in safe deposit activities as inci-
dental to the business of banking. 12
It is well settled today that both state and national banks
may engage in safe deposit activities. The state authority to
engage in such activities varies from explicit authority, such as
that found in New York, New Jersey and Michigan;1 3 to gen-
eral authority permitting state banks to engage in activities
that are incidental to the business of banking, such as that
found in Alabama, North Carolina, and Wyoming; 14 to au-
thority that permits state banks to engage in activities which
national banks may engage in, such as that found in Arizona
and North Dakota; 15 to implied authority, where the reference
to safe deposit boxes in state statutes implies that they must be
9. See Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REv. 565 (1966); Leav-
itt, The Philosophy of Financial Regulation, 90 BANKING L.J. 632 (1973); Redord, Dual
Banking: A Case Study in Federalism, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 749 (1966).
10. See supra note 7. See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-9-102 (Supp. 1983); N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 96(3)(b) (McKinney 1971). Both are codifications of much earlier
statutory enactments.
11. "The obvious fact, known to all, is that national banks do and for many years
have carried on a safe-deposit business." Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41,
49 (1940). See also Roberts v. Minier, 240 Ill. App. 518 (1926); Young v. First Nat'l
Bank of Oneida, 150 Tenn. 451, 265 S.W. 681 (1924); McDonald v. Perkins & Co., 133
Wash. 622, 234 P. 456 (1925).
12. Bank of Cal. v. City of Portland, 157 Ore. 203, 69 P.2d 273 (1937), cert. de-
nied, 302 U.S. 765 (1938).
13. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 96(3)(b) (McKinney, 1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-
24 (West 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 487.488'(1970).
14. ALA. CODE § 5-5A-18(11) (Repl. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-43(1) (Repl.
1982); Wyo. STAT. § 13-2-101 (1977).
15. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-184 (Supp. 1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-38
(Repl. 1975).
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permitted. 16 With respect to national banks, the authority de-
rives from the powers incidental to the business of banking. 17
There is, however, specific statutory authority, such as that
contained within the proviso to section 24, which impliedly
permits banks, or explicitly authorizes their affiliates or sub-
sidiaries, to engage in safe deposit activities.
More often than not, safe deposit activities in the past
have been undertaken by a department within the bank, rather
than through an affiliate or subsidiary. This practice was
largely due both to the fact that safe deposit activities were
conducted as a non-profit-making activity as well as the fact
that the demand for safe deposit services was not as great as
the supply of safe deposit facilities. Thus, it made no sense to
engage an affiliate or a subsidiary. It is likely, however, that
the future will see greater numbers of banks (and bank hold-
ing companies) engaging in safe deposit activities through
subsidiaries.
Although banks historically have been the primary pro-
vider of safe deposit services, the increase in personal wealth
has provided an incentive for the creation of new safe deposit
companies. While safe deposit companies themselves are not
a new phenomenon, particularly in large urban areas," their
size and numbers will likely grow in the future. On the whole,
their rights and responsibilities are essentially the same as
those of banks, at least insofar as safe deposit activities are
concerned.19
III. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
A. The Pre-Colonial History of Safekeeping Activities
The history of safekeeping activities is the history of
16. ALA. CODE § 5-5A-18(11) (Repl. 1981); CAL. FIN. CODE § 757 (West 1968).
17. 12 U.S.C. § 38 (1982); see Bank of Cal. v. City of Portland, 157 Ore. 203, 69
P.2d 273 (1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 765 (1938); see also G. MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF BANKING AND FINANCE 811 (7th ed. 1973).
18. See Banks as Lessors of Safe Deposit Boxes, 18 BANKING L.J. 770 (1901);
Hodge, Law of Safe Deposit, 3 DET. L. REV. 69 (1933); Hatch, Safe Deposit History,
THE SAFE DEPOSIT BULL. (June 1931).
19. Safe Deposit Co. v. Pollock, 85 Pa. 391 (1878); Cussen v. Southern Cal. Sav-
ings Bank, 133 Cal. 534, 65 P. 1099 (1901); Schaefer v. Washington Safety Deposit Co.,
281 Ill. 43, 117 N.E. 781 (1917).
730 [Vol. 38:727
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banking itself. In ancient Egypt and Babylon, individuals who
occupied positions of trust in the community were entrusted
with the valuables of others, usually for a fee, under circum-
stances resembling our modern banking practices.2" Later,
the ancient Greeks discovered that their temples provided a
safe haven for valuables, and it is perhaps there that the first
true equivalent of the modern safe deposit vault existed.2 1
Originally, the services were gratuitous, but eventually safe-
keeping services became part of the established business of
banking, and uniform changes coupled with complete record-
keeping became the norm.22
In each succeeding civilization from that time until to-
day, the need for banks became quickly apparent. Just as
trade and commerce necessitated banks, the wealth brought
about by such trade and commerce necessitated safe places for
the storage of that wealth. The banks, charged with other fi-
nancial responsibilities, became an obvious storage house for
the valuables of their customers.
B. The Colonial History of Safekeeping Activities
On our own continent, during the colonial period, smiths
and other businessmen performed the safekeeping function
rather than banks, for banks were, initially, nonexistent. In
colonial days, as elsewhere throughout history, commerce was
originally transacted by means of barter. There was little pre-
cious metal wealth, and that which was considered valuable in
terms of trade, such as tobacco, corn, and beaver pelts,23 was
not susceptible to safekeeping. Further, although wampum
was capable of storage, it was not monetized except in terms
of pure barter. Thus, the colonists, though "wealthy," did not
have enormous wealth of the sort that had to be safekept.
As the colonies developed, and trade became more so-
20. N. HOGGSON, BANKING THROUGH THE AGES 33-34 (1926); See also Bank of
Cal. v. City of Portland, 157 Or. 203, 69 P.2d 273 (1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 765
(1937).
21. N. HOGGSON, BANKING THROUGH THE AGES 33-34 (1926).
22. Id. at 34-35.
23. J. WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON BANKING LAW 1 (1976); P. STUDENSKI
AND H. KROOS, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 12-13 (2d ed. 1963).
1985] 731
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phisticated, money systems were developed. Thus, in the hun-
dred years beginning around 1650 and ending in
approximately 1750, colonial mints for the coinage of gold,
silver, and copper were established, and paper money made its
appearance. 24 British reaction was predictable; by the mid-
1700's, coinage and production of paper money were prohib-
ited by the Crown.25 The prohibition was to a large extent
ignored, and the colonists formed banks for the purpose of
continuing the production of paper money.26 This money was
used in trade, and for the primary purpose of purchasing
land," so the colonists were still without substantial wealth of
the sort that would require safekeeping, and the "banks"
therefore did not perform safekeeping functions with any sig-
nificant regularity.
C. Early American Safekeeping Activities
Following the American Revolution, it became apparent
to the new American governors that one or more banks would
be required. The public, however, distrusted banks, largely as
a result of the depreciated money that had been printed pre-
ceding and during the War of Independence. Nevertheless,
formal banks were recognized as necessary to facilitate trade
and commerce, and the first American commercial bank, the
Bank of North America, was founded in 1782.28 Not surpris-
ingly, the Bank of North America's charter did not make any
mention of safekeeping activities. Although the grant of
power contained within the congressional charter was proba-
bly sufficiently broad to encompass safekeeping activities,29
they were by no means specifically permitted. There were two
reasons for this omission: first, the need for safekeeping serv-
24. P. STUDENSKI AND H. KROOS, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
14-15 (2d ed. 1963).
25. Id. at 14-15, 17.
26. Id. at 15.
27. Id. at 15-16.
28. Id. at 3 1; see also Symons, "The Business of Banking" in Historical Perspective,
51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 676, 686 (1983); Lord, The No-Guaranty Rule and the Standby
Letter of Credit Controversy, 96 BANKING L.J. 46, 48 (1979); P. STUDENSKI & H.
KROOS, supra note 24, at 31; J. WHITE, supra note 23, at 2.
29. M. CLARKE & D. HALL, LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 2-13, 14-35 (1832).
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ices was not yet great; and second, backers of the bank were
more concerned with its survival than with exercising inciden-
tal powers. However, the bank not only survived, it
flourished.
Shortly after the successful establishment of the Bank of
North America, the Bank of New York and the Bank of Mas-
sachusetts were formed, each having as its main object the
performance of a traditional banking business in a major
American city (New York and Boston). Like the Bank of
North America-which had since become a state chartered
bank in Pennsylvania 30-the Bank of New York and the Bank
of Massachusetts we'e both permitted to exercise broad pow-
ers by their charters and regulations.3' Nevertheless, there
was no specific mention of the safekeeping function.
These initial ventures into banking were so successful
that, by 1800, almost thirty banks existed throughout the
country,32 and ten years later, almost one hundred banks ex-
isted.33  Despite the rapid growth of the banking business,
there is no indication that any of these banks were authorized
to perform a safekeeping business. Although all of the char-
ters .have not been reviewed, the state laws pursuant to which
the charters were issued have been, and it is clear that in none
of the state laws was there specific authority to engage in safe-
keeping activities. Nevertheless, these activities were already
an established part of the young banking industry in this
country. Thus, it is apparent that in the period between the
Revolution and the War of 1812 the newly formed banks be-
gan to respond to the need of their customers for safekeeping
services. The apparent reasons were the expansion of trade,
the development of one or more stable currencies, and the
growth of individual wealth, particularly among the traders.
This conclusion is made explicit by the early landmark
decision of Foster v. Essex Bank,34 decided by the Supreme
30. J. WHITE, supra note 23, at 2; P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOS, supra note 24, at
32.
31. Those regulations later became N.Y. BANKING LAW § 106(5) (McKinney
1921); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79 (West 1921).
32. P. STUDENSKI & H. KROOS, supra note 24, at 73 n.12.
33. Id. at 73; J. WHITE, supra note 23, at 8 (75 state banks).
34. 17 Mass. 479, 9 Am. Dec. 168 (1821).
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Court of Massachusetts in 1821. The case dealt with a "spe-
cial deposit" of approximately $50,000 in gold that had been
left by one Israel Foster. Foster brought the money to the
bank for safekeeping and received a receipt indicating the de-
posit. Sometime later, the cashier and clerk of the Essex Bank
absconded with this and other monies. The executors of
Israel Foster's estate brought suit against the bank to recover
$50,000.
The importance of the case lies in its recognition of the
fact that banks engaged regularly in the receipt of special de-
posits. The court noted:
The practice of receiving [special deposits for safekeeping]
must have originated in a willingness to accommodate
members of the corporations with a place for their
treasures, more secure from fires and thieves than their
dwelling-houses or stores; and that is rendered more prob-
able from the well-known fact, that not only money or
bullion, but documents, obligations, certificates or public
stocks, wills and other valuable papers, are frequently, and
in some banks as frequently as money, deposited for safe
keeping. This is wholly different from the deposits con-
templated in the act on which notes may be issued, for
they enter into a capital stock, become the property of the
bank, as much as their other moneys, and the bank be-
come debtors to the depositors for the amount. 35
It is clear from the Essex case that most banks engaged in
the receipt of special deposits for safekeeping purposes as
early as the early-1800's. The safekeeping deposit in that par-
ticular case had been made prior to 1814. According to the
court, the bank was not specifically authorized to accept spe-
cial deposits for safekeeping, either by the act pursuant to
which it was incorporated or by its internal charter, rules, or
regulations:
[N]otwithstanding the act of incorporation gives no
particular authority or power to receive special deposits,
and although the verdict finds that there was no regula-
tion or by-law relative to such deposits, or any account of
them required to be kept and laid before the directors or
35. Foster, 17 Mass. 479, -, 9 Am. Dec. 168, 177 (1821).
734 [Vol. 38:727
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the company, or any practice of examining them; yet as it
is found that the bank, from the time of its incorporation,
has received money and other valuable things in this way,
and as the practice was known to the directors, and, . . .
as the building and vaults of the company were allowed to
be used for this purpose, and their officers employed in
receiving into custody the things deposited, the corpora-
tion must be considered the depositary .... 36
The questions presented for the court were whether the
bank should bear responsibility for the act of its agent and the
degree of care to which it would be held responsible.37 The
safekeeping at issue was gratuitous. In that respect, it differed
from the modem safe deposit or safekeeping function. Never-
theless, the Essex case clearly demonstrates that this form of
safekeeping activity was well recognized and established in the
formative period of our country.
D. Early Federal Authority to Engage in Safekeeping
Activities
In 1864, Congress passed the National Currency Act,
which was the forerunner to and embodied many of the provi-
sions of the National Bank Act. That statute provided that
national banks could engage in activities that were incidental
to the business of banking. Moreover, one section provided
that, upon the insolvency of a bank, it could no longer engage
in the business of banking except, among other things, to de-
liver special deposits which had been entrusted to it. 38
Although one might have asked for a more explicit grant of
authority, the statute certainly suggested that banks were per-
mitted to take special deposits. Since banks were given specifi-
cally enumerated powers, which did not include the power to
take special deposits, and since they were given additional
general powers necessary to conduct the business of banking,
and since another section presupposed the existence of special
36. Id. at 170.
37. The points raised are to some extent unsettled even today. See Lord, The
Legal Relationship Between the Bank and Its Safe Deposit Customer, 5 CAMP. L. REV.
263 (1983).
38. Section 46 of the National Currency Act, currently found in the National
Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 38 (1982).
1985] 735
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deposits, it certainly appeared as though special deposits were
"incidental to the business of banking."
The Essex case suggests that it had long been the custom
of banks to receive special deposits, even before the apparent
authority to receive the deposits was granted by the Act of
1864. The Massachusetts court that decided Essex forty years
earlier was generally considered to be one of the leading
courts of its day.39 In fact, the Essex decision put an end for a
while to the question of whether a bank could engage in the
safekeeping function-most bankers and lawyers apparently
reading the decision to establish safekeeping as incidental to
the business of banking. Given that, and the fact that the Act
of 1864 at least strongly suggested that the safekeeping func-
tion was incidental to the business of banking, it was to be
expected that the question would forever be put to rest. How-
ever, exactly the opposite was true; the question began to be
litigated with increasing frequency.
One can only speculate as to the reasons for the increased
litigation concerning whether banks had authority to engage
in the safekeeping of their customer's valuables. There appear
to have been at least three reasons. First, the passage of the
1864 Currency Act gave rise to an argument based upon the
distinction between state and national banks. The Essex deci-
sion had dealt with state banks, for only state banks had ex-
isted to any significant degree prior to the mid-1860's.
Following the enactment of the National Currency Act, which
provided for the chartering of national banks, there was a con-
certed effort to eliminate state chartered banks and a concomi-
tant effort to charter national banks.' Thus, it could be
argued that Essex established a particular proposition for state
banks and that the Currency Act established a new category
of banks to which different rules might apply. In this connec-
tion, it must be borne in mind that the Essex Bank did not
39. See, e.g., another opinion written by the court on safe deposits, Bottom v.
Clarke, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 487 (1851). See also J. WHITE, THE REGULATION AND
REFORM OF THE AMERICAN BANKING SYSTEM 25 (1983); J. WHITE, supra note 23, at
18-19.
40. See Symons, supra note 28, at 699. Some believe that this effort was solely that
of Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury at the time. See J. WHITE, supra note 23,
at 18-19.
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appear to have regulations imposed upon it or enacted by it;
the National Currency Act specifically enumerated certain
powers and allowed for the conduct of other general activities
incidental to banking. Thus, a theoretical distinction existed
because national banks could only do what the National Act
permitted.
Second, the doctrine of ultra vires, which predated the
existence of the United States, was developing with regard to
banks at approximately this time. To the extent that banks
were being developed as modem corporations, corporation
law doctrines such as ultra vires were being tested as applica-
ble. While it has been suggested that the courts have always
distinguished between banks and other corporations, the dis-
tinction has not always been well articulated. 41 In fact, the
probability is "that when banking was developing in this
country, its corporate identity was viewed as being compara-
ble to that of any corporation."42 Thus, when banks were
sued for having lost safekept property, they invariably re-
sponded with one of two arguments: first, that it was beyond
the power (ultra vires) of a bank to safekeep a customer's
property, and therefore the bank could not be liable;43 or sec-
ond, that the teller or other officer receiving the property
lacked authority to bind the bank.' Both of these doctrines,
broadly applicable to corporations in general, were raised by
banks to escape liability. It is interesting to note that the
banks were less successful here than they have been in other
areas. 45 Nevertheless, the insistence by banks that they lacked
41. Lord, The No-Guaranty Rule and the Standby Letter of Credit Controversy, 96
BANKING L.J. 46, 54-55 (1979).
42. Id. at 55; See also Symons, supra note 28, at 686-88. State v. Kelsey, 53 N.L.J.
590, 22 A. 342 (1891); N.J. Title & Trust Co. v. Rector, 76 N.J. Eq. 587 (1910).
43. See, e.g., Pattison v. Syracuse Nat'l Bank, 80 N.Y. 82, 36 Am. Rep. 582
(1880); Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479, 9 Am. Dec. 168 (1821); Third Nat'l Bank v.
Boyd, 44 Md. 47, 72 Am. Rep. 35 (1876).
44. See Foster v. Essex Bank, 17 Mass. 479, 9 Am. Dec. 168 (1821); Scott v. Nat'l
Bank of Chester Valley, 72 Pa. 471, 13 Am. Rep. 711 (1874); Lancaster County Nat'l
Bank v. Smith, 62 Pa. 47 (1869).
45. See Safe Deposit Co. v. Pollock, 85 Pa. 391, 27 Am. Rep. 660 (1878); Lock-
wood v. Manhattan Storage & Warehouse Co., 28 A.D. 68, 50 N.Y.S. 974 (1898); Cus-
sen v. Southern California Say. Bank, 133 Cal. 534, 65 P. 1099 (1901); Tacoma Park
Bank v. Abbott, 19 A.2d 169 (Md. 1941); Taylor, Legal Considerations Affecting Safe
Deposit Practices, 74 BANKING L.J. 751, 755 (1957); Note, Liability of Lessors of Safe
1985] 737
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the power to safekeep property almost certainly fueled
litigation.
The third reason for the increased litigation concerning
the banks' authority to safekeep customer valuables had little
to do with banking as such. Rather, it had to do with techno-
logical innovation in the form of the invention, in the 1860's,
of the modem safe deposit box.46 This ingenious device revo-
lutionized safekeeping, for it became possible for a customer
to place valuables in a sealed container, obtain individual ac-
cess, and yet store this sealed container within a safe or vault.
It became less important who had access to the vault area,
since, without the individual customer's key, it was impossible
(absent violent means) to enter the safe deposit box of a partic-
ular individual. Thus, the character of the vault became more
important than the character of the individual guarding or
maintaining the vault.
One result of this technological development was that
safe deposit companies began to be formed for the express
purpose of storing the valuables and documents of individuals.
The first of these safe deposit companies was organized in
1865, 47 and safe deposit companies were soon formed in the
major cities. 4 The result was not only to give rise to competi-
tion between safe deposit companies and banks but also to call
into question the legitimacy of the safekeeping function as in-
cidental to the business of banking. That question therefore
became ripe for consideration by the courts.
Beginning around 1870, the appellate courts heard cases
dealing with the issue of whether national banks could engage
in safekeeping. Most of the decisions cited Essex with ap-
proval.49 Only in Vermont was a contrary result reached, in
Deposit Boxes, 7 MD. L. REV. 76, 80 (1942); Lord, The No-Guaranty Rule and the
Standby Letter of Credit Controversy, 96 BANKING L.J. 46 (1979). Symons, supra note
28, at 701-14.
46. This invention was a "comparatively late development in American Banking."
G. MUNN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 811 (7th ed. 1973).
47. Id.; Taylor, supra note 45.
48. MUNN, supra note 46; Banks as Lessors of Safe Deposit Boxes, supra note 18, at
771.
49. See, e.g., Scott v. Nat'il Bank of Chester Valley, 72 Pa. 471 (1874); Turner v.
First Nat'l Bank of Keotuck, 27 Iowa 562 (1869); Smith v. First Nat'l Bank of West-
field, 99 Mass., 605 (1868); Lancaster County Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 62 Pa. 47 (1869);
738
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Wiley v. First National Bank of Brattleboro,50 where the court
declined to adopt the Essex rationale:
[In Essex] it was decided that, on account of that practice,
and not because it was a part of legitimate banking busi-
ness, the bank became charged with the liabilities of a de-
positary of the coin. . . . no other case as to the scope of
the powers of banks. . appears to have arisen and been
decided between that and the passage of the Act of Con-
gress in 1864, under which this bank was organized. 5
The Wiley court determined that the business of receiving
special deposits was not incidental to the business of banking
but was more incidental to the business of warehousing. Ap-
plying the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the men-
tion of one excludes all others), the court held that the
National Currency Act did not authorize the receipt of special
deposits. Furthermore, to the argument that the mention of
special deposits elsewhere in the National Currency Act im-
plied that banks might receive them, the court responded that
that section was intended not to add powers, but to restrict
them. In fact, the Wiley court explicitly declared that the
chief difference between Wiley and Essex was the fact that, in
Essex, the charter did not expressly stipulate what banks
could do, whereas the National Currency Act did. The failure
to include special deposits among the enumerated powers was
fatal.
The courts of the time apparently took Essex to mean at
least that a state bank, even if it could not properly take spe-
cial deposits, would be estopped from denying liability in the
event that it did take a special deposit with the approval of its
directors.52 The same courts apparently believed that Wiley
stood for the proposition that a national bank was not empow-
ered to take gratuitous special deposits. And, if it did, the
First Nat'l Bank of Carlisle v. Graham, 79 Pa. 106 (1879); Chattahoochee Nat'l Bank v.
Schley, 58 Ga. 369, 198 S.E. 559 (1877).
50. 47 Vt. 546 (1875); See also Whitney v. First Nat'l Bank of Brattleboro, 50 Vt.
389 (1877).
51. Wiley v. First Nat'l Bank of Brattleboro, 47 Vt. 546, 553 (1875).
52. Lancaster County Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 62 Pa. 47 (1869); Scott v. Nat'l Bank
of Chester Valley, 72 Pa. 471 (1874); Smith v. First Nat'l Bank of Westfield, 99 Mass.
605 (1868).
1985] 739
HeinOnline  -- 38 Ark. L. Rev. 739 1984-1985
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:727
cashier who took them became solely responsible. Certainly,
the highest courts in the states of Maryland and New York,
two jurisdictions significantly more commercially important
than Vermont, believed that Wiley stood for that proposition.
Thus, in First National Bank v. The Ocean National Bank,53
the Court of Appeals of New York indicated quite strongly in
dictum that the taking of special deposits was not an incident
of banking. The court expressed its doubts, indicating that
the bank's powers were
banking powers only, with such incidental powers as may
be necessary to carry on the business of banking, with the
privilege of buying and selling exchange, coin and bullion.
This does not necessarily include the business of a safe de-
posit company, or [the] business of receiving for safe keep-
ing, and storing for hire, or without compensation, jewelry
and valuables, or property of any kind. If the power exists
in the corporation as part of its franchise, it is only as an
incident of its principal business. 4
The deposit of these bonds cannot be distinguished from a
deposit of jewelry or plate, or other valuable property, and
was a special transaction not within the ordinary course
and business of banking, or necessarily incident to it."
The New York court distinguished the Essex case on the
basis of the acquiesence of the directors and then made clear
that, since there had been no acquiesence in the case before it,
there was no reason to determine whether the bank had the
power to receive special deposits.5 6 However, during the time
between the writing of the decision and its publication, the
court was made aware of the Wiley case. That fact led the
New York Court of Appeals to observe:
[Wiley] held that the cashier of a national bank has no
power to receive special deposits in behalf of the bank for
the accommodation of the depositor, or to bind the bank
to any liability on any express contract accompanying, or
any implied contract arising out of such taking, and the
53. 60 N.Y. 278 (1875).
54. Id. at 287.
55. Id. at 289.
56. Id. at 294.
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judgment is sustained by a well-considered opinion ...
In his views I fully concur.7
This decision apparently placed New York, one of the
premier commercial states in the country, in the camp of
those who argued strenuously that national banks-or for that
matter, any banks-did not have the power to receive special
deposits. Such a decision virtually ignored a number of other
cases which had implicitly recognized the ability of national
banks to take special deposits,58 as well as the language of sec-
tion 46 of the National Currency Act (which permitted banks,
upon insolvency, to pay special deposits). Moreover, it placed
Essex into that category of cases which determined that only if
a bank's directors acquiesed in a course of conduct could the
bank be responsible. Essex was no longer the leading case on
the question of whether a bank could take special deposits;
rather it became a leading case on estoppel or acquiesence for
purposes of corporate ratification. Moreover, Wiley, which
had not sought to distinguish Essex on this ground alone, but
which seemed to repudiate it on an exclusio unius basis, be-
came transformed into the leading case. It quite clearly stood
for the proposition that national banks had no power to re-
ceive special deposits.
On the heels of the Ocean National Bank case came the
decision in Third National Bank v. Boyd.59 The Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland had before it the issue of whether a national
bank had the power to take and hold certain stocks and bonds
which had originally been deposited as collateral for a loan,
when the loan had been fully discharged. The stocks and
bonds had been deposited with the bank as collateral for the
bank's ongoing lending to Boyd. Very often, however, and for
substantial periods of time, Boyd would not owe the bank any
money, and yet the bank would maintain his bonds in its
vault. During one such period, the bank was robbed, and the
57. Id.
58. Turner v. First Nat'l Bank of Keokuk, 26 Iowa 562 (1869); Smith v. Nat'l
Bank of Westfield, 99 Mass. 605 (1868); Lancaster Co. Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 62 Pa. 47
(1869).
59. 44 Md. 47, 22 Am. Rep. 35 (1876).
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bonds were stolen. The plaintiff brought suit against the bank
to recover the value of the bonds.
The bank defended on, among other grounds, the basis
that it was beyond its power to take special deposits gratui-
tously or for hire. The court, in dictum, agreed:
There is very strong ground, both upon reason and au-
thority, in support of the proposition that a National
Bank, deriving its existence and exercising its powers
under the Act of Congress referred to, is not authorized to
enter into a contract as a mere gratuitous bailee, by receiv-
ing on special deposit for safe-keeping merely, coin, jew-
elry, plate, bonds or other valuables. Such a contract does
not appear to be authorized by the terms of [the Act] as a
transaction "within the ordinary course and business of
banking or incident to it;" and has been decided by [the
Wiley court] to be unauthorized by law, and beyond the
scope of the corporate powers.60
The Maryland court also cited the Ocean National Bank
case and specifically assumed that both of those cases were
correct.61 The court held, however, that the deposit was not a
mere special deposit because the original contract was for the
bank to take the stocks and bonds as collateral. The fact that
no debt was currently owed did not change the original char-
acter of the deposit, which was one for security.
Thus, by 1875, the legitimacy of national banks receiving
special deposits was called into question by the courts of at
least three states, including two of the most well-respected
commercial states. The Essex decision, rendered fifty years
earlier by an equally important commercial state, Massachu-
setts, had been largely discredited for its main proposition,
although followed regularly for other propositions. What had
seemed so clear in 1821, on the basis of centuries old practices,
was now called into serious doubt.
These decisions were the result of banks urging ultra vires
when special deposits they had taken could not be returned to
the depositors. It was now apparent that in all jurisdictions a
bank which did not regularly take special deposits could not
60. Third Nat'l Bank v. Boyd, 44 Md. 47, 61, 22 Am. Rep. 35, 39 (1876).
61. Id. at 62, 22 Am. Rep. at 39.
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be held liable, but more than that could not be said. A split
apparently existed beyond that issue, with some courts citing
Essex for the proposition that banks could take special depos-
its, others citing it for the proposition that they could be es-
topped from denying their ability to take special deposits, and
others flatly disagreeing with Essex. In addition, a number of
cases existed where, although the issue should have been ad-
dressed, it was not. Given that, prudent bankers should have
refused to accept special deposits or, if they accepted them,
should have done so knowing they were leaving their banks
open to liability. Unfortunately, the information that was
available to bank attorneys, and perhaps even to bank officers,
apparently did not reach cashiers and clerks. The cases indi-
cate quite clearly that the cashiers, clerks, and tellers contin-
ued to take special deposits (although the cases also indicate
that very often they did not take them without first objecting
to taking them, and then only upon a clear statement of nonli-
ability). Thus, cases where special deposits had been taken
and subsequently not redelivered continued to arise, and the
bank-defendants in those cases continued to plead ultra vires.
In two such cases, decided at approximately the same
time, the courts, for the first time, squarely addressed the issue
of whether national banks could receive special deposits. The
reason for considering this question, which had been consid-
ered only in dictum earlier, is not at all clear. It does appear,
however, that the attorneys for the respective banks in these
two cases argued more vigorously than they had earlier that
the banks were without power to engage in safekeeping. The
apparent reason for this was that in both cases a pattern of
acquiesence had been engaged in, and gross negligence had
been found. Thus, the only question at issue was whether a
national bank had the power to engage in safekeeping or could
be estopped from denying such power.
The two cases were proceeding through the court systems
of Pennsylvania and New York at approximately the same
time. The New York case, Pattison v. Syracuse National
Bank,62 was decided by the New York Court of Appeals
62. 80 N.Y. 82, 36 Am. Rep. 582 (1880).
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shortly before the United States Supreme Court decided Na-
tional Bank v. Graham.63 The Supreme Court cited Pattison
with approval, and Pattison had in turn cited the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's opinion in the Graham case. Both of these
decisions irrevocably determined that national banks had the
power to engage in safekeeping activities.
In Pattison, the New York Court of Appeals traced the
cases dealing with special deposits that had arisen both prior
to and after the passage of the National Currency Act. The
court noted that in many cases the corporate power to engage
in safekeeping had not been made an issue and then discussed
the cases wherein the issue had been raised, beginning with
Foster v. Essex Bank. Noting that the bulk of the decisions
had cited Essex with approval, the court returned its attention
to the three jurisdictions where Essex had apparently not been
approved: Vermont, Maryland, and New York. The court
first indicated that Wiley was the only case which squarely
decided the issue contrary to Essex. It then noted that the
Ocean National Bank case had approved of Wiley only in dic-
tum, and then by a minority of the court. The Pattison court
made clear that the dictum of Ocean National Bank did not
have basis in law or history, noting that historically, the earli-
est function of banking was that of safekeeping. On these ba-
ses, the New York Court of Appeals, perhaps the most
influential commercial court in the country at the time, suc-
cinctly held: "On the question of corporate power, we are
therefore of the opinion that National banks have power to
receive special deposits, gratuitously or otherwise, and that
when received gratuitously they are liable for their loss by
gross negligence.""
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Gra-
ham, of course, was to be the final word on the subject. In
that case, the plaintiff had, beginning in 1867, deposited bonds
with the defendant bank for safekeeping. The cashier cut off
and redeemed coupons for the plaintiff and deposited the pro-
ceeds in the plaintiff's account with the bank. The directors
knew of the deposit, and the deposit for safekeeping was gra-
63. 100 U.S. 699 (1880).
64. Pattison v. Syracuse Nat'l Bank, 80 N.Y. 82, 97, 36 Am. Rep. 582, 590 (1880).
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tuitous. The plaintiff sued when the bonds were allegedly sto-
len, and the bank urged a charge to the jury that national
banks were not authorized to receive deposits for safekeeping
and that the cashier had acted without authority and could
therefore not bind the bank. The lower court instead charged
the jury that if the officers and directors acquiesed in the safe-
keeping, and the bank were negligent, the plaintiff could re-
cover. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff which,
according to the United States Supreme Court, conclusively
established the acquiesence and gross negligence.65
The Supreme Court began its consideration of the issues
raised by assuming that the contract was illegal as a result of
ultra vires. It nevertheless indicated that the rule established
by Essex would be applied with respect to national banks. 66
Referring to Wiley (and a subsequent Vermont decision,
Whitney v. First National Bank of Brattleboro)67 as the only
direct authority to the contrary, the Court indicated that,
given the acquiesence and the conclusive determination of
gross negligence, the bonds involved were the responsibility of
the bank and not the cashier alone. The Court, however, de-
cided the issue on "another ground free from doubt. ' 68 That
ground was the unquestioned authority of national banks to
engage in safekeeping activities.
The Court first explored section 46 of the 1864 Act,
which indicated that on default, banks could pay out special
deposits. The implication existed that national banks could
receive special deposits, an implication which, according to
the Court, was the same as an express declaration of that fact.
The Court next determined that a special deposit existed in
the case before it, citing the Pattison case. It then concluded
that national banks could receive special deposits "either on a
65. "The jury was instructed that . . . 'plaintiff's bonds were received for
safe-keeping with the knowledge and acquiescence of the officers and directors
of the Bank, and that if the bonds were lost by the gross negligence of the bank
and its officers the Bank was liable.' [T]he jury thus found and affirmed the
facts of knowledge and gross negligence by the Bank. These points are, there-
fore, conclusively established. Graham, 100 U.S. at 701.
66. Id. at 702.
67. 50 Vt. 388 (1877).
68. Graham, 100 U.S. at 703.
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contract of hiring or without reward" 69 and that liability for
negligence would flow from the safekeeping activities.
The Graham case established conclusively that national
banks could engage in safekeeping activities. It did so primar-
ily on the basis that had been urged in prior cases, including
Wiley, i.e., that the inclusion of a reference to special deposits
elsewhere in the National Currency Act implied that national
banks could engage in safekeeping activities. This basis fore-
shadowed what was to become the rule fifty years later rela-
tive to safe deposit services.
The Pattison case, on which Graham relied in part, did
more than merely signal the direction that the Supreme Court
would take. While it is true that Pattison placed New York
squarely in line with the Essex decision, the case is important
for at least two other reasons. First, the indications are quite
strong that the National Currency Act would be interpreted
so as to effectuate competitive equality between national and
state banks. Such an interpretation accords well with histori-
cal notions of our dual banking system.7 ° Second, it suggests
the actual role that was being played by the developing safe
deposit companies. As to the first matter, the Pattison court
made abundantly clear its thought that, regardless of whether
a bank's charter was state or national, the question of the
bank's power to receive special deposits and engage in safe-
keeping would be answered the same.71 Thus, Pattison must
have appeared to establish not only that national banks oper-
ating in New York could engage in safekeeping activities but
also that state banks could do so. Certainly, there is a clear
recognition in Pattison of the fact that safekeeping activities
were being regularly performed by banks generally.72
The second point is at least as important as the first. The
invention of the safe deposit box created a new industry of safe
deposit companies. These companies often took the form of
69. Id. at 704.
70. Redford, Dual Banking: A Case Study in Federalism, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 749 (1966).
71. "[N]o distinction can be made in determining this question between a state and
a National Bank." Pattison v. Syracuse Nat'l Bank, 80 N.Y. 82, 90, 36 Am. Rep. 582,
584 (1880).
72. Pattison v. Syracuse Nat'l Bank, 80 N.Y. 82, 93, 36 Am. Rep. 582, 587 (1880).
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safe deposit and trust companies. The Pattison court, in re-
viewing the facts giving rise to the controversy, made clear
that for some time the Syracuse National Bank had engaged
in safekeeping activities for its customers. It further made
clear that before the particular deposit in dispute was made,
"a trust company was formed in Syracuse for the receipt of
valuables for safe-keeping, and that after the formation of that
company . . . the cashier [decided] that they had better not
take any more packages for safe-keeping . . . ."' In other
words, it appears from the Pattison opinion that safe deposit
and trust companies were beginning to be formed for the pur-
pose of engaging in the safekeeping business and that they
were competing directly with the banks.
E. The Beginning of Safe Deposit Activities in the
United States
The Graham and Pattison cases and their forebears al-
most all indicate a recurrent fact pattern: a customer of the
bank arrived with a package, usually in the form of an envel-
ope, containing bonds, stocks, or other valuables; the cashier
took these valuables, inventoried them, agreed to take them
for safekeeping, and occasionally gave the customer a receipt
for them; thereafter, the customer returned to the bank, only
to find that the valuables were missing. There were variations
on this theme, but invariably, once the valuables had been ac-
cepted for safekeeping by the bank, they were placed in the
general vaults of the bank. Obviously, there were substantial
risks involved for the customer. First, there was always the
risk of the defalcating cashier. Second, there was the risk that,
in transporting the envelopes containing the valuables from
the vault to the customer or back to the vault, the envelope or
its contents would be lost or misplaced. Additionally, a bur-
glar who breached the security of the vault was, without
more, capable of gaining possession of the securities. These
risk factors, coupled with the development of the individual
safe deposit box, led to the development of trust and safe de-
posit companies. Beginining in the mid-1860's, these compa-
73. Id. at 97, 36 Am. Rep. at 591.
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nies, particularly in the urban areas, began to compete with,
and in some cases displace, banks in their safekeeping
function.
It must have been apparent to the bankers of the time
that safe deposit boxes were likely to displace in large measure
the safekeeping function of banks, for, as illustrated in the
Pattison case, the existence of these companies served to dis-
courage safekeeping by the banks. Logically, however, it
made little sense for a bank customer to engage in safekeeping
or safe deposit activities with a trust or safe deposit company,
at least if that company could not offer other services as well.
After all, the cases indicate that to a large extent safekeeping
activities were carried on gratuitously. Moreover, banks al-
ready had vaults that were, if not impenetrable, at least quite
strong. Beyond that, banks could offer safekeeping services in
rural areas where it would not be economically feasible to es-
tablish a safe deposit company. Initially, banks likely viewed
safe deposit companies as welcome adjuncts to the banking
world, or perhaps viewed them with indifference, or at worst,
as potential competitors. Over a period of years, however,
two things must have become apparent: first, that banks,
other than perhaps in urban areas, would continue to engage
in safekeeping activities for their customers; and second, that
people were willing to pay for safekeeping services. Therefore,
banks could, by engaging in safe deposit activities, continue to
serve their customers, and at the same time make (or at least
not lose) money.
The banks were equipped for safekeeping services. The
vaults existed, so it was merely a matter of constructing safe
deposit facilities within a bank, or perhaps acquiring a safe
deposit company. Once it became apparent that safe deposit
activities could be conducted for a fee, that bank customers
desired safe deposit or safekeeping services on a greater scale
than had been undertaken in the past, that safekeeping could
legally be undertaken without any question, and that in-
dependent safe deposit companies were not only being formed
but were successful, it was only natural that banks would be-
gin to engage in safekeeping and safe deposit activities to a
much greater extent.
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The period between 1880 and the early-1920's was a pe-
riod of turmoil in the banking industry.74 It was also, appar-
ently, a period of extraordinary growth in the area of safe
deposit and safekeeping services. Oddly enough, it was also a
period of remarkable calm in the judicial development of legal
rules relative to safekeeping and safe deposit activities. How-
ever, while the courts were not confronted with the question
of whether banks could engage in safekeeping or safe deposit
activities during this period, the legislatures of the various
states were prevailed upon to pass legislation permitting safe-
keeping and safe deposit activities. It was in the latter part of
the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century that
state statutory enactments either recognized that banks and
trust companies were engaged in safe deposit activities, or ex-
plicitly conferred the power to engage in safekeeping and safe
deposit activities upon these institutions. Thus, Paton's Di-
gest, beginning in 1926, listed a significant number of jurisdic-
tions which "expressly authorized one or more kinds of
banking institutions to receive special deposits or conduct a
safe deposit business or have given statutory recognition to the
right of banks to conduct such business . . . . 7 The statu-
tory recognition existed primarily in tax statutes which set re-
quirements for the opening of safe deposit boxes following a
decedent's death.76
The passage of these statutes in numerous states follow-
ing the Graham decision suggests a legislative attempt
(spurred by the banks' lobbying efforts) to head off litigation
concerning the question of whether state banks had authority
to engage in safe deposit activities. The thought may well
have been that, given the indications from the Graham case
concerning the relationship between state and national banks,
as well as the history behind the National Currency Act,
which suggested equality between the two types of banks, leg-
islative pronouncements with respect to state banks would be
74. J. WHITE, THE REGULATION AND REFORM OF THE AMERICAN BANKING
SYSTEM 25 (1983).
75. 2 PATON'S DIGEST § 4191(2) (1926).
76. See MINN. STAT. § 2282 (1913); N.D. COMP. LAWS ch. 225 (1919); N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 106(5) (McKinney 1921); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79 (West
1921).
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effective with respect to national banks as well. In any event,
for one reason or another, the passage of the statutes appar-
ently forestalled litigation concerning the entire question of
whether banks-state or national-could engage in safe de-
posit activities.
However, other questions concerning the safekeeping and
safe deposit functions were regularly litigated during that
time. Indeed, such important questions as whether the con-
tents of a safe deposit box could be reached by garnishment or
attachment, the standard of care applicable to a bank involved
in safe deposit activities, and related liability questions were
litigated during this period.7 7 But, as was the case with safe-
keeping for the fifty-year period between the Essex and Wiley
decisions, the ultimate question of whether a bank could en-
gage in safe deposit activities was not litigated at all.
The lack of litigation on this issue might well have sig-
naled that banks were not engaged, to any large extent, in the
safekeeping or safe deposit function. However, the evidence is
to the contrary. First, the existence of the state statutes au-
thorizing the conduct of a safe deposit or safekeeping function
suggests legislative reaction to an existing phenomenon. Sec-
ond, in the 1926 edition of Paton's Digest, Paton responds to
an inquiry concerning the power of state and national banks
to engage in safe deposit activities. The question-whether a
state or national bank has the power to conduct safe deposit
activities, absent statutory authority, either through a safe de-
posit department or a separate safe deposit company-is an-
swered affirmatively, although cautiously. The digest, in an
opinion dated 1924, reports that the question has never been
squarely ruled upon, but the author goes on to state: "In view
of the extent to which banks are now taking over the safe de-
posit business, the probability is it will be held the operation of
such a business is within the power of a bank. ' '78
77. Botton v. Clarke, 7 Cush. 487 (Mass. 1851); Jones v. Morgan, 90 N.Y. 4, 43
Am. Rep. 131 (1882); Safe Deposit Co. v. Pollock, 85 Pa. 391, 27 Am. Rep. 660 (1877);
Mayer v. Brensinger, 180 IlL. 110, 54 N.E. 159 (1899); State v. Kelsey, 53 N.J.L. 590, 22
A. 342 (1891). See also Lord, The Relationship Between The Bank and its Safe Deposit
Customer, 5 CAMP. L. REV. 263 (1983).
78. 1 PATON'S DIGEST § 4189 (1926).
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Those cases which dealt with banks and safe deposit ac-
tivities in the period between 1880 and the 1920's did not ad-
dress the question of a bank's authority to engage in safe
deposit activities, primarily for the reason that bank counsel
did not seek to avoid liability on the basis of ultra vires. Hav-
ing won the right to engage in safekeeping activities in Gra-
ham (while at the same time losing the ability to claim ultra
vires), it would have been disingenuous for the banks, which
were beginning to conduct safe deposit activities on a large
scale, to construct vaults or purchase safe deposit companies
and then attempt to contend that their having done so was
beyond their corporate power. It was one thing for the banks
to claim ultra vires with respect to safekeeping; after all, the
vaults were in existence, the safekeeping activity was under-
taken as an accommodation for the customer in most cases,
and the procedures used by the banks in safekeeping were, if
not haphazard, by no means rigorously institutionalized. The
safe deposit activities, on the other hand, were by their nature
different. In order to engage in safe deposit activities, the
bank had to affirmatively construct safe deposit vaults for safe
deposit boxes, or purchase safe deposit companies with the
vaults and boxes already constructed. Beyond that, having
expended sums of money to engage in safe deposit activities,
the banks had to charge a fee to their customers for safe de-
posit box use. The service could no longer be conducted gra-
tuitously, although it was by no means a profit-making
function.7 9 Finally, because the customer played a role in safe
deposit box access, institutional access procedures had to be
developed. It was no longer sufficient for bank officers to re-
treat to the vault alone, pick up the valuables of the customer,
and allow the customer to examine them. Rather, the cus-
tomer had to accompany the officer, use his key for access
along with the officer's, and was then entitled to examine the
contents in private. These three factors, among others, would
almost certainly preclude an assertion by the bank that safe
deposit activities were ultra vires.
In fact, the determination of the question of whether a
79. McBain, Safe Deposit Procedures, 70 BANKING L.J. 242 (1953).
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national bank could engage in safe deposit activities arose in a
rather peculiar context. The banks which sought to escape
liability for safekeeping losses on the basis of lack of corporate
power were asserting that they were legally entitled to engage
in safe deposit activities and, as nationally chartered entities,
they were immune from state and local taxation with regard
to those activities.
Given the fact that state banks were generally permitted
to engage in safe deposit activities, as well as the fact that na-
tional banks were actively involved in safe deposit activities by
the time that the two leading cases were decided, it is not sur-
prising that the outcome of the cases permitted national banks
to engage in safe deposit activities. It is, however, somewhat
surprising that it took nearly sixty years following Graham for
the controversies to arise.
The first case to consider the question, Bank of California
v. City of Portland,0 involved a dispute between three national
banks and the City of Portland, Oregon, which had enacted a
license tax on the conduct of safe deposit businesses. In 1935,
the City of Portland assessed license fees against the three na-
tional banks based upon their operation of safe deposit vaults.
(The licensing ordinance had existed in Portland since 1921,
but it is not clear whether the banks had paid the tax in the
past.) The banks objected to the payment of the license tax on
the basis that they were national banks, chartered by the fed-
eral government, and were therefore immune from taxation as
instrumentalities of the federal government so long as they
were engaged in business pursuant to their charters. In other
words, if conducting a safe deposit business were part of the
business of banking, and if national banks were subject solely
to regulation by the federal government, as instrumentalities
of the federal government, the state or local governments
could not legitimately tax them. Thus, the question as to
whether conducting safe deposit activities was incidental to
the business of banking was squarely presented. The Supreme
Court of Oregon agreed with the national banks that it was
incidental to the business of banking and further agreed that,
80. 157 Or. 203, 69 P.2d 273 (1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 765 (1938).
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as a result, the banks were immune from state or local
taxation.
The court noted initially that there were no precedents on
point and that its decision would therefore have to be guided
by analogy. It then sought to find an appropriate source of
law beyond the analogical precedents of special deposits (in-
cluding Essex and its progeny) and determined that it was ap-
propriate to look to banking custom and history. Noting that
fifty, and even one hundred years earlier, the arguments raised
with regard to safe deposit boxes had been raised with respect
to safekeeping and the taking of special deposits generally, the
court referred to Pattison and the historical underpinnings of
banking, both of which suggested that safekeeping of some
kind had existed for centuries. The only real question then
became whether safekeeping could be undertaken through the
use of safe deposit boxes, as opposed to the general vaults of a
bank. Perhaps most critical to the court's decision was the
fact that, contained within a proviso to section 24 of the Na-
tional Bank Act,8' there was express permission to invest in
the capital stock of a safe deposit company. Given that, cou-
pled with the testimony adduced at trial that national banks
operated safe deposit facilities throughout the United States,
the court had no difficulty reaching its conclusion: "The oper-
ation of safe deposit vaults by national banks is within the
incidental powers granted to such banks by Congress and
therefore is not ultra vires. ''2
Other language in the City of Portland case suggests that
the result might not have been the same had the case arisen
significantly earlier in time. Thus, the court stated:
Time was, perhaps, when the safe deposit vault business
would not be considered an integral part of the banking
business, but in this day and age, as the testimony shows,
the modem bank is not complete without safe deposit fa-
cilities, just as in earlier times the business of banking
would have failed in one of its most important phases if
the practice of receiving valuables for safekeeping had
81. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982).
82. Bank of Cal. v. City of Portland, 157 Or. 203,-, 69 P.2d 273, 277 (1937), cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 765 (1938).
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been eliminated.83
The proviso to section 24 which permitted banks to in-
vest in state safe deposit companies conclusively demonstrated
to the court that banks not only conducted safe deposit facili-
ties but that Congress was aware of that fact and had provided
banks an alternative method for doing so:
This language recognizes the fact which Congress knows,
which every banker knows, and which the courts and pub-
lic know, that such safe-deposit business is being carried
on by every important national bank in the entire country.
This proviso was not a grant of an exclusive power, for-
bidding the exercise of the power in any other manner, but
rather it is an extension of the power to conduct a safe-
deposit business, an alternative method. 4
A similar issue came before the United States Supreme
Court three years later, this time concerned with the legality
of a Colorado state law which imposed a tax, payable by the
banks, on the users of safe deposit boxes. The case, Colorado
National Bank v. Bedford,"5 suggests that the Supreme Court
of Oregon may have been incorrect with respect to its decision
on the tax issue;86 it left little doubt, however, that the Oregon
high court had rendered the correct decision with respect to
the safe deposit function of banks.
In the Bedford case, a Colorado state statute imposed a
tax equal to two percent of the value of services that were
performed by banks. According to the statute, the tax was to
be paid by the bank but was to be passed on to the user or
consumer of the service to the extent practicable. The Colo-
rado National Bank operated a safe deposit department, and
the two percent tax was assessed against the safe deposit serv-
ices rendered. The bank refused to make payment, and the
state sought a declaratory judgment with respect to the valid-
ity of the tax statute. The bank alleged that safe deposit activ-
ities were incidental to the business of banking pursuant to its
national charter and therefore were immune from state taxa-
83. Id. at -, 69 P.2d at 279.
84. Id.
85. 310 U.S. 41 (1940).
86. See id. at 51-53.
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tion. The trial court ruled in favor of the bank initially but
was reversed by the Colorado Supreme Court. The trial court
then found for the state and was affirmed.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision
of the Colorado Supreme Court. The Court, after satisfying
itself that jurisdiction existed, premised its remarks on the as-
sumption that national banks could exercise only those pow-
ers conferred upon them by Congress.87 The Court then
quoted the incidental powers clause of section 24 of the Na-
tional Bank Act, as well as the safe deposit proviso, which
permitted national banks to invest in state safe deposit compa-
nies. The Court noted that national banks were permitted to
accept special deposits and then stated its belief that the ac-
ceptance of special deposits
differs little if at all from a safe-deposit business. The lan-
guage of the proviso . . . is the language suitable to im-
pose restrictions on a recognized power, not the language
that would be used in creating a new power. . . . [T]he
banks' own investment in safety deposit facilities evidently
did not seem to Congress to require the same regulation as
the purchase of stock in a safe-deposit corporation. A
subsidiary safe-deposit corporation would give priority to
the creditors of the subsidiary over the depositors and
other creditors of the bank itself. The obvious fact, known
to all, is that national banks do and for many years have
carried on a safe-deposit business. State banks, quite usu-
ally, are given the power to conduct a safe-deposit busi-
ness. We agree with the appellant bank that such a
generally adopted method of safeguarding valuables must
be considered a banking function authorized by
Congress."8
Thus, for the first time, the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled on the question of whether a national bank could
engage in the safe deposit business. The Court's reasoning
was threefold: safe deposit activities were not significantly
distinct from safekeeping activities; Congress had recognized
that banks engaged in safe deposit activities and permitted
87. Id. at 48.
88. Id. at 49-50. On the role this case played in the development of the "business
of banking," see Symons, supra note 28, at 711-12.
1985] 755
HeinOnline  -- 38 Ark. L. Rev. 755 1984-1985
ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW
them to do so through subsidiary safe deposit companies; and
banks had engaged in safe deposit activities so that custom, in
and of itself, might justify recognition of the power to engage
in safe deposit activities.
F. Present Authority to Engage in Safekeeping and
Safe Deposit Activities
Based on the City of Portland and Bedford cases, it is now
well settled that national banks may engage in safe deposit
activities. With respect to state banks, the precise issue of
whether a state bank may engage in safe deposit activities is
governed by the statutes creating and regulating those banks.
In many jurisdictions, the state statutory scheme specifically
provides for the authority to engage in safe deposit activities.8 9
In others, the authority is not granted specifically, but rather
it exists as a result of an incidental powers clause similar to
that in section 24 of the National Bank Act,90 or a statute
which permits state banks to do all that nationl banks may
do.91 Finally, in a few jurisdictions, there is at best implied
authority where reference is made to safe deposit boxes in
other state enactments such as tax, will-search, or unclaimed-
property statutes, thus suggesting legislative recognition of an
ongoing practice.92 It remains possible in such a state for a
court to declare safe deposit activities beyond the power of a
state bank. However, in view of the history behind safe de-
posit activities, the implications which exist by virtue of refer-
ences in other state statutes to safe deposit boxes, and the
extent to which safe deposit activities are currently being per-
formed by all banks-state and national-such a declaration
would be highly improbable.
89. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 5-5A-18(11) (Repl. 1981); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-184 (Supp. 1974); COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-9-102 (Supp. 1983); GA. CODE § 7-1-
261(2) (Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, § 309 (Smith-Hurd 1981); MASS. GEN
LAws ANN. ch. 168, § 69 (West 1977).
90. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 5-5A-18(11) (Repl. 1981); MD. FIN. INST. CODE ANN.
§ 3-206 (1980); 1984 LA. ACTS. 719, § 1; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-43(1) (Repl. 1982);
WYO. STAT. § 13-2-101 (1977).
91. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-184 (Supp. 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 6-03-38 (Repl. 1975).
92. See ALA. CODE § 5-5A-18(11) (Repl. 1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 26-401
(1981).
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IV. AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN SAFE DEPOSIT
ACTIVITIES THROUGH A SUBSIDIARY OR
AFFILIATE
No discussion of the authority of banks to engage in safe-
keeping and safe deposit activities would be complete without
discussing the fact that a substantial number of banks engage
in safe deposit activities through safe deposit subsidiaries or
affiliates. As the history of safe deposit activities suggests, the
development of the modem safe deposit vault occurred in the
mid-19th century as a result of the invention of the safe de-
posit box that required two keys for access. This invention led
to the development of a new business-the safe deposit com-
pany. It was this historical accident that strengthened the ar-
gument that safe deposit activities were not a necessary
adjunct to the business of banking, for if non-banks could and
did engage in this type of activity, surely it was not an activity
solely within the province of banks. Nevertheless, and while
banks eventually overcame the competitive challenge
presented by the safe deposit companies, it became quite clear
that institutions other than banks could safekeep customer
valuables.
As is often the case with competitors, the adage, "if you
can't beat them, join them," began to make some sense. Thus,
to the extent that safe deposit companies were ever a serious
competitive force, the banks began to seek to absorb them.
Moreover, it became clear to a number of bank attorneys that
separate corporate entities provided insulation from the ex-
traordinary potential liability that might result from safekeep-
ing or safe deposit activities. With legislation in a number of
states authorizing formation of safe deposit companies, it be-
came a relatively common practice to form a safe deposit com-
pany to perform safe deposit activities on the premises of the
bank. All that remained was to ensure that such activities
were lawful.
Beginning in 1924, Congress considered the issue of
whether national banks could engage in safe deposit activities
through affiliates. Paton's Digest reports that, in that year, a
bill was introduced that would have permitted national banks
to invest in safe deposit corporations located on or adjacent to
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bank premises, up to an amount equal to fifteen percent of the
bank's capital and surplus.93 The bill is reported to have
passed the House in early 1925 but failed in the Senate. Al-
most two years thereafter, in February 1927, Congress passed
the proviso to section 24.94
The legislative history behind the proviso reveals virtu-
ally nothing about why it was enacted. As has been seen, na-
tional banks had actively engaged in safe deposit activities on
their premises for a number of years. What little information
currently exists suggests that national banks were expanding
their activities through the use of separate corporate entities.
Thus, it is likely that congressional action mirrored develop-
ments within the industry, rather than the industry seeking
congressional approval before beginning to conduct business
in that particular manner.
This conclusion is suggested very strongly by the 1924
edition of Paton's Digest. The digest reports that no case au-
thority existed at the time directly authorizing national banks
to form a separate safe deposit company. Paton, however,
suggests that such activity would likely be permissible in view
of analogical precedents. Furthermore, in another portion of
the digest, Paton sets forth a provision from the New York
statute which quite clearly contemplated and permitted the
formation of independent safe deposit companies.95 That stat-
ute, section 106 of the New York banking law, permitted
banks to purchase safe deposit stock so long as the safe deposit
company was doing business on premises owned or leased by
the bank and provided further that the board of directors first
authorized the purchasing and holding of that stock.96
Paton advised incorporation of a safe deposit company,
with ownership of the stock primarily in the bank, in order to
limit the liability of the bank. He concluded that "the advan-
tage of incorporation would be that in case of a large loss the
liability of the company would be limited to the assets and
capital liability of the safe deposit company and not involve
93. 1 PATON'S DIGEST § 4190 (1926).
94. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982).
95. 2 PATON'S DIGEST § 4192(a) (1926).
96. Id. (quoting N.Y. BANKING LAW § 106(5) (McKinney 1921)).
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the bank." 97 Oddly enough, what gave rise to this advice was
"the uncertainty of the law upon the question of liability"'98
caused by lack of clarity as to what would constitute reason-
able care. 99
Given the fact that New York was undoubtedly the lead-
ing commercial state at the turn of the century, and the fact
that Paton's Digest was perhaps the most authoritative and
heavily relied upon research tool of bank counsel, there is no
doubt but that a substantial number of banks in New York
incorporated safe deposit companies and purchased their
stock. What remained unclear was whether it could be done
by national banks. Congress, following the lead of New York,
determined in 1927 that it could be.
The proviso to section 24 states:
That in carrying on the business commonly known as the
safe-deposit business the association shall not invest in
capital stock of a corporation organized under the law of
any State to conduct a safe-deposit business in an amount
in excess of 15 per centum of the capital stock of the asso-
ciation actually paid in and unimpaired and 15 per cen-
tum of its unimpaired surplus. 0°
Thus, in 1927, it was made clear for the first time that national
banks could engage in the safe deposit business through safe
deposit subsidiaries.
As was indicated earlier, the language of the proviso
played a large part in convincing the United States Supreme
Court in the Colorado National Bank case that conducting
safe deposit business was incidental to the business of banking.
In footnote 22 of that case, the Court cites the legislative his-
tory of the proviso and indicates that Congress clearly per-
ceived safe deposit activities as part of the legitimate business
of banking. The House report, referred to by the Court, made
clear that "[t]his is a business which is regularly carried on by
national banks and the effect of this provision is also primarily
97. 2 PATON'S DIGEST § 4192(a) (1926).
98. Id.
99. See Lord, The Legal Relationship Between the Bank and Its Safe Deposit Cus-
tomer, 5 CAMP. L. REV. 263 (1983).
100. 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1982).
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regulative."' 0 1 That report, of course, bolsters the notion that
this type of activity was going on throughout the early part of
the twentieth century, and that Congress merely recognized it
in the mid-1920's.
Since the passage of the proviso, banking has developed
and changed forms many times. Thus, today, much of the
business of banking is conducted through bank holding com-
panies. It becomes 'important, therefore, to consider the ex-
tent to which a bank holding company may engage in safe
deposit activities through an affiliate or subsidiary.
Obviously, a bank owned by a bank holding company
could engage in safe deposit activities directly. And, it could
do so itself by purchasing shares of the safe deposit company
pursuant to section 24. However, for good reason, the bank
holding company may prefer to independently acquire a safe
deposit company so that the safe deposit company can con-
duct business as a subsidiary or affiliate of the holding com-
pany, not directly as a subsidiary of the bank. That it may do
so is made explicitly clear by the Bank Holding Company
Act.
Section 1843 of title 12 of the United States Code limits
the activities of bank holding company subsidiaries to busi-
nesses that are closely related to banking. Section 1843(C)
states that despite prohibitions on certain activities,
such prohibitions shall not, with respect to any other bank
holding company, apply to-
(1) shares of any company engaged or to be engaged
solely in one or more of the following activities: ...
(B) Conducting a safe-deposit business .... 102
In other words, under the Bank Holding Company Act,
bank holding companies may invest without limit in safe de-
posit companies. This section appears to be a recognition of
the fact that safe deposit activities are "so closely related to
banking . . . as to be a proper incident thereto."'10 3
101. Colo. Nat'l Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41, 50 n.22 (1940).
102. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1982).
103. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The history of safe deposit activities in the United States
suggests that originally banks engaged in safekeeping activities
notwithstanding that they lacked authority to do so. They did
so primarily for customer convenience, and, if the cases are to
be believed, eventually regretted having done so. The banks
themselves fostered substantial debate concerning the legiti-
macy of the safekeeping function when they were asked to
bear responsibility for losses of customer property. When it
became apparent that they could not escape liability for these
losses on the basis of ultra vires, the banks continued to do
that which they had always done: safekeep customers'
valuables.
At that point, however, they encountered a new chal-
lenge, that created by the safe deposit companies which began
to be formed in the mid- 1800's. With the invention of the safe
deposit box, the banks for the first time could engage in safe-
keeping and yet provide the customer with privacy. Safe de-
posit companies began to be formed to take advantage of the
expanded market for keeping individual's valuables. Ulti-
mately, for a variety of historic reasons, the banks began to
engage in safe deposit activities in competition with the safe
deposit companies and eventually fully supplanted them in all
but the major urban markets. Unfortunately, it was not clear
that banks had the authority to lease safe deposit boxes.
Beginning around the turn of the century, the states led
the way in developing legislation which clearly permitted the
banks to engage in safe deposit activities, in reality merely rec-
ognizing what the banks had been doing for years. In the
mid-1920's, Congress authorized banks to engage in safe de-
posit activities through subsidiaries, though there was still no
explicit authority to engage in safe deposit activities through a
department within the bank itself. In the late-1930's, the
Supreme Court of the United States finally ruled that banks
did indeed have the power to engage in safe deposit activities,
on the ground that such activities were necessary to the busi-
ness of banking.
Today, virtually all banks have safe deposit departments.
These departments are authorized not only to national banks
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through Supreme Court edict and congressional implication,
but also to state banks through a variety of state statutes.
Moreover, banks are permitted to engage in safe deposit activ-
ities through affiliates or subsidiaries, the stock of which is
owned by the bank or through subsidiaries owned by a bank
holding company under the Bank Holding Company Act.
The history of safe deposit activities in the United States
is in many ways reflective of the history of numerous other
aspects of the banking industry and commercial law in this
country."°4 As has been generally true, the law in this area
followed and developed as a result of commercial practice.
The banks, without Clear authority to do so, undertook to pro-
vide a service demanded by their customers. When it was to
their advantage to do so, they denied the ability to engage in
the activity and therefore disclaimed responsibility for loss oc-
casioned by it. And when it was to their advantage to be able
to engage in the specified activity, they urged it as their right.
The courts and legislatures eventually recognized it as a legiti-
mate activity and regulated it appropriately.
But the history of safe deposit activities is more than of
mere historical importance. Today, as much or more than at
any time in the history of our country, the banking and other
commercial industries are faced with new challenges caused
by innovations and market pressures. To the extent that they
meet these challenges as they have in the past, i.e., by address-
ing them in a commercial manner regardless of their actual
authority to do so, the courts and other regulators can deal
with problems as they arise in a manner consistent with his-
torical antecedents.1 1 5 By recognizing that commercial prac-
tice often gives birth to regulation, and not vice versa, the
courts and other regulators can permit the development of
needed commercial devices yet govern those devices
appropriately.
104. See generally Symons, supra note 28, at 714-26.
105. Id.
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